

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

Austin 11, Texas

March 18, 1949

Hon, Durwood Manford, Speaker House of Representatives 51st Legislature Austin, Texas Opinion No. V-788.

Res Question of mileage and per diem of heldover member of the Legislature.

Dear Sir:

Your request for an epinion is based on the following facts which are recited in substance in your previous letter of January 24, 1949:

Mr. W. E. Heatiy was elected and qualified to represent the 104th District in the 50th Legislature, 1947, Mr. A. M. Eanes was elected to that office for the 51st Legislature, 1949. Eanes became seriously ill and submitted his resignation to the Governor after the election but before qualifying for the office. The Governor immediately accepted the resignation and forthwith called a Special Election for February 10, 1949, to elect a successor to Eanes. In Opinion Ne. V-760, in answer to your former question, it was held that Mr. Heatly should continue to represent the District until his successor was elected and qualified. The holding was made pursuant to Section 17 of Article XVI of the Texas Constitution which provides that "All officers within this State shall continue to perform the duties of their offices until their successors shall be duly qualified."

Your present inquiry is whether Mr. Heatly, who has now been succeeded by a newly elected Representative, is entitled to be paid from the first day of this session, January 11, 1949, or from the day on which he was administered the eath on January 26, 1949. You further ask whether Mr. Heatly is entitled to mileage in coming to the seat of government and returning.

The fundamental Constitutional provision in question is Section 24 of Article III which reads in part:

"Members of the Legislature shall receive from the public treasury a per diem of not exceeding \$10.00 per day . . .

"In addition to the per diem the members of each House shall be entitled to mileage in going to and returning from the seat of government..."

While there is some disagreement in other states as to whether the incumbent (Heatly) holds ever under an extension of his term¹ or by "tenure," the great weight of authority under both views, as assessmed in Opinion No. V-760, helds that the incumbent (Heatly) continued in effice with all the powers, duties, and responsibilities thereto attached until his successor qualified. Thus Hon. C. M. Cureton, as First Assistant Attorney General, litter Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, wrete in 1914;

State v. Ferguson, 148 Ohie St. 581, 76 N.E.2d 373 (1947); State v. Stafford, 99 Mont. 88, 43 P.2d 636 (1935); Wood v. Miller, 154 Ark. 318, 242 S.W. 573 (1922); State v. Bowden, 92 S.C. 393, 75 S.E. 866 (1912); Baker City v. Murphy, 30 Or. 405, 42 P. 133 (1895); 22 R.C.L. 555, Public Officers, \$ 258.

² Fullerton v. Mann, 214 Ky. 764, 284 S.W. 113 (1926); State v. Carroll, 133 Wash, 459, 234 P. 22 (1925); People v. Sweitzer, 280 Ill. 436, 117 N.E. 625 (1917); State v. Young, 137 La. 102, 68 Sc. 241 (1915); 46 C.J., 963, 971, Officers, Section 96, 116.

Schrock v. Hylton, 133 S.W.2d 175 (Civ. App. 1939); Plains Common Consol. School Dist. v. Hayhurst, 122 S.W.2d 322 (Civ. App. 1938); State v. Jordan, 28 S.W.2d 921 (Civ. App. 1930, error dism.); Walker v. Hopping, 226 S.W. 146 (Civ. App. 1920); Bensen v. Mellor, 152 Md. 481, 137 A. 294 (1927); Jansky v. Baldwin, 120 Kam. 332, 243 Pac. 302, 47 A.L.R. 476; 34 Tex. Jur. 370, Public Officers, Section 31; 43 Am. Jur. 19-22, Public Officers, Sections 161-164; 42 Am. Jur. 980, Public Officers, Section 139; 46 C.J. 968, 969, Officers, Sections 119, Ill; Mechem "Public Officers," p. 257, Section 397; Throop "Public Officers," p. 329, Section 328; Annotation 74 A.L.R. 486.

"... the term of office of a member of the Legislature shall be two years ... but ... nevertheless, after the expiration of the term thus fixed by the Constitution, he shall continue to perform the duties of his office until his successor shall have been duly qualified."4

Consistent with such principle are holdings that an officer holding over is a "de jure" officer. Two Texas cases have so held. State v. Jordan, 28 S.W.2d 921, (Civ. App. 1939, error dism.); Cowan v. Capps, 278 S.W. 283 (Civ. App. 1925, rev. on other grounds, 286 S.W. 161); 34 Tex. Jur. 379, Public Officers, Sec. 31. This is the rule in other states also. 46 C.J. 969, 1816, Officers, Sections III and 235,

This conclusion reached by the courts from the above holdings is that such officer is entitled to the emoluments of the office. The rule has been stated in 46 Corpus Juris 1816 in these words: "A de jure officer, by law entitled to held over until a successor has been elected or appointed and qualified... is entitled to the compensation of the office during the period of holding over." The rule is similarly stated in 22 Ruling Case Law 525 that:

"It is a well established principle that a salary pertaining to an office is an incident of the office itself... Yet the right to a public office carries with it the right to any emeluments which may pertain to it, and to the person legally holding the office belong the perquisites and emoluments attached by law to the office, as fully does the office itself... A public officer entitled to hold over after the expiration of his term until his successor should be elected may continue to draw his salary during the time in which he holds over."

Opinion No. 1298, to Gov. Colquitt, dated Oct. 20, 1914, and found in Reports and Opinions of the Attorney General 1914-16, at page 505.

This rule is amply supported by Texas cases and other authorities,5

Former Atterneys General have held in prior opinions that in order for newly elected members to qualify as members of the Legislature, so as to be entitled to per diem and mileage, the claimants must have taken the constitutional oath of office. However a holdover continues in effice by virtue of his prior election and qualification, and there is no necessity for him to requalify for office during the holdover period. The taket is stated that:

"An officer holding over until his successor is chosen does so by virtue of his previous appelatment, election, and qualification, and unless so required by some provision of the law he need not requalify." 42 Am. Jun. 974, Public Officers, \$ 128.

The Texas Supreme Court in the case of Spears v. Sheppard, 136 Tex. 277, 150 S.W.2d 769 (1941), held that the right to per diem is not dependent on actual attendance at the sessions of the Legislature.

We therefore hold that Mr. Heatly is entitled to his mileage in going to and returning from the seat of government and to per diem from January 11, 1949, the first day of the session, until such time as his successor duly qualified.

⁵ Markwell v. Galveston County, 186 S.W.2d 273 (Civ. App. 1945, error ref.); City of San Antonio v. Steingruber, 177 S.W. 1923 (Civ. App. 1915, rev. on other gra'ds, 220 S.W. 77); 34 Tex. Jur. 551, 628, Public Officers, \$ 198, 178; 42 Am. Jur. 884, Public Officers, \$ 6; 43 Am. Jur. 136, 137, Public Officers, \$ 342, 343.

Opinion No. 8-5186; Opinion No. 2858 to Thomas R. Bend, found in Reports and Opinions of the Atheresy General 1938-32 at page 277; Opinion No. 1298 to Gov. Colquitt, dated October 29, 1914, and found in Reports and Opinions of Attorney General 1914-16, at page 505; See also 34 Ten. Par. 359, 361, Public Officers, 2 24, 23,

⁷ See sias 22 R.C.L. 452, Public Officers, 2 199,

SUMMARY

A member of the 50th Legislature who holds over until his successor in the 51st Legislature qualifies is entitled to mileage and per diem from the first day of the session of the 51st Legislature until such successor qualifies. See Opinion V-768.

Years very truly,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

Joe R. Greenidii Piret Asstetant

Analatant

FLiviere

APPROVED:

ATTORNEY GENERAL